South Korea’s foreign-espionage offence takes effect; technology cases must still involve national secrets
A new South Korean foreign-espionage offence is now in force, but technology cases require national secrets and a defined foreign link.
- South Korea's amended Criminal Act, including new Article 98-2, became effective on 13 September 2026.
- The new offence provides a minimum three-year prison term for specified conduct involving national secrets when the required foreign connection is present.
- Article 98-2 adds to, rather than replaces, the existing enemy-state espionage provision in Article 98.
- Officials have linked the reform to protection of strategic technologies, but the provision is not an automatic espionage charge for every corporate trade-secret transfer overseas.
A new offence is now operative
South Korea's amended Criminal Act took effect on 13 September, bringing a new foreign-espionage offence into operation. New Article 98-2 sets a minimum prison term of three years for specified espionage conduct involving national secrets when it is connected to a foreign country or an equivalent organisation under the conditions in the law.
The date matters because the change is no longer only a legislative amendment or policy proposal. It is now an operative provision in the Criminal Act. The official National Law Information Center record identifies the amended law as effective from 13 September 2026, while Reuters reporting republished by U.S. News and other independent coverage describe the change as South Korea seeks stronger protection for strategically important technology.
That policy context has made semiconductors the most visible shorthand for the reform. But the wording of Article 98-2 is more specific than a general reference to chips or industrial know-how. The central statutory term is national secrets. That distinction is essential to understanding both what the new offence adds and what it does not automatically cover.
What Article 98-2 says
Article 98-2 addresses a person who acts for a foreign country or an equivalent organisation, or does so under its direction, instigation or contact, in relation to national secrets. The provision lists conduct including discovering, collecting, disclosing, delivering, brokering or assisting with national secrets. For the specified conduct, the statute establishes a minimum term of three years' imprisonment.
The foreign connection is not incidental language. It is part of the defined structure of the offence, alongside the requirement that the material at issue be national secrets. Reporting the provision as a blanket prohibition on information moving to an overseas party would leave out both of those limits.
Nor does the statute itself name a country, company or individual. The law creates a category of offence through its stated elements; it does not establish that any particular actor has committed one. The reportable development is the law's effective date and wording, not an accusation against a technology business or foreign government.
The earlier enemy-state provision remains
Article 98-2 is an addition to the Criminal Act, not a replacement for South Korea's pre-existing espionage provision. Article 98 continues to address espionage for an enemy state. The new article sets out a separate offence involving the foreign-country or equivalent-organisation framework described in the amended law.
That legislative design is why the change is being described as an expansion of espionage coverage. It extends the framework beyond the earlier enemy-state provision while retaining it. At the same time, expansion should not be mistaken for unlimited scope: the newer provision still uses national secrets and a defined foreign link as its key terms.
For technology readers, the difference is practical. The policy discussion can be about protecting advanced industrial capability, but the legal question in a possible case is not simply whether information is commercially valuable. The facts would have to be assessed against the elements set out in Article 98-2.
Why strategic technology is part of the debate
South Korean officials and reporting have connected the reform to efforts to protect strategic technologies. Semiconductors, displays, batteries and artificial intelligence are among the sectors cited in that context. These fields combine high-value research, manufacturing knowledge and international supply chains, making the policy rationale particularly relevant to the technology sector.
The rationale is broader than any single product line or industry. Article 98-2 is framed around national secrets, not around semiconductors alone. Describing it only as a chip-espionage law risks narrowing the statute's stated subject matter, while describing every technology dispute as espionage risks expanding it beyond the language that has taken effect.
The selected policy framing therefore requires two ideas to be held together. South Korea has moved to strengthen the legal framework in a period of heightened concern about strategic technology, and the new provision still turns on statutory conditions rather than on a general label for corporate information.
Why a trade-secret case is not automatically covered
A corporate trade secret and a national secret are not interchangeable terms in the material supporting this report. The statute uses national secrets. As TechNode Global's legal-technology coverage noted, the new provision's application is tied to its specific elements, including the foreign-actor connection. It should not be read as automatically converting every overseas transfer of a company's confidential information into foreign espionage.
That does not make the change insignificant for companies working in sensitive areas. It does mean that a headline about technology protection should not substitute for the statutory test. Whether a particular technology-leak allegation could fall within Article 98-2 will depend on whether the relevant national-secret and foreign-link requirements are met, as well as on enforcement and court decisions.
This is also why caution is warranted in discussing future cases. The fact that the offence has entered force does not predict a particular prosecution, outcome or interpretation. The official text gives the new framework; its practical effect will emerge through enforcement and judicial decisions.
What to watch after the effective date
The immediate development is clear: Article 98-2 is in force. The next important evidence will be how authorities apply the provision in cases involving alleged handling of national secrets, and how courts address its foreign-country or equivalent-organisation connection. Those decisions will show how the statutory language operates beyond the text of the amendment.
For the technology sector, the useful watchpoints are narrower than the broad rhetoric surrounding industrial security. Future reporting should distinguish an allegation from an established finding, identify whether national secrets are actually at issue, and avoid assuming that an overseas relationship alone meets the new offence's requirements.
The reform arrives as South Korea places strategic technology protection high on its policy agenda. Its significance lies in the new legal tool and the wider foreign-connection framework it adds. Its limits lie in the same statute: Article 98-2 is not a catch-all for technology or trade-secret cases, and its future enforcement effect remains uncertain.
Reader guide
Article questions, answered
Short answers to common reader questions based on the reporting above.
When did South Korea's new foreign-espionage offence take effect?
The amended Criminal Act, including new Article 98-2, took effect on 13 September 2026. The effective date is shown in the official National Law Information Center record.
Does Article 98-2 make every overseas trade-secret transfer espionage?
No. Article 98-2 is framed around national secrets and a specified foreign connection. Whether a particular technology-leak case meets the offence will depend on the statutory elements and on enforcement and court decisions.
What is the minimum prison term under the new provision?
Article 98-2 sets a minimum prison term of three years for the specified conduct involving national secrets when the required foreign-country or equivalent-organisation link is present.
Sources and further reading
These references support the factual context used in this article. Links open the original publisher.
- Criminal Act (Act No. 21450), Articles 98 and 98-2Korean National Law Information Center · accessed 14 September 2026
- South Korea's expanded espionage law takes effect amid push to protect chip technologyReuters via U.S. News & World Report · accessed 14 September 2026
- South Korea broadens espionage law to cover foreign actorsTechNode Global · accessed 14 September 2026
- Expanded Espionage Law Takes Effect, Critics Say It Falls Short on Tech TheftAju Press · accessed 14 September 2026
